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The Lost History of Apprendi and the Blakely
Petition for Rehearing

Volumes surely will be written about our visions, and
the realities, of the post-Blakely world. However, before
we all march reluctantly or otherwise into that future, it is
valuable to fully acknowledge the past. As the Petition for
Rehearing filed on Behalf of Washington State in Blakely
(hereinafter "Pet.") explained, Blakely and Apprendiwere
undoubtedly founded on an erroneous historical understanding of the Framers' views in 1790 when they wrote
the 6th Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. The fact that
the Framers themselves wrote over a dozen indeterminate
sentencing ranges in the first federal crime bill (see iStat.
112-i18; Pet. at 3-4), has simply been overlooked by the
Court. A full and fair debate about the constitutional
rules still being defined (most immediately in Booker
and Fanfan) cannot be had if this history is ignored.
Thus we are very grateful to Professor Doug Berman
and the editors of the Federal Sentencing Reporter for
reprinting the Petition in full below. Although the Petition
was denied without opinion on August 23, 2004, the
constitutional debate to which it speaks is far from over.
Amid the robust and fruitful policy discussions about
sentencing that Blakely has engendered, it is possible
to forget that Blakely and Apprendi state constitutional
rules. As such, without a firm basis in the Constitutional
text, their holdings may not legitimately be applied to the
States, whether or not their policy effects are good are bad.
Yet the precise steps to reach the constitutional holding of
Blakely tend to be ignored. It is worthwhile then to review
the relevant constitutional language that allegedly requires
Blakelys result: "The Trial of all Crimes ...
shall be by
jury" (Art. III, sec. 2) and "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to... trial, by an impartial
jury..." (Sixth Amendment).
Concededly, there is no "plain language" here about
sentencing. Thus sentencing has never been viewed part
of the "criminal prosecution" for Sixth Amendment purposes (or part of the "Trial" mentioned in Article III), such
that jury sentencing would be constitutionally required
in all criminal cases. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376,
385 (1986).' We know this to be true most fundamentally
because when the Framers themselves wrote sentencing
statutes - in 1790, contemporaneously with drafting
the Bill of Rights and sending it to the States for ratification - they did not require jury involvement. Federal

sentencings, by judges alone, were subsequently carried
out as the living and breathing Framers watched. Silence
can sometimes speak volumes. See Pet. at 6 & n.8.
RORY K. LITTLE
Thus constitutional interpretation is required to de&
termine whether, and when, the Constitution requires
jury involvement in punishment determination. And of TERESA CHEN
course, for at least the past quarter-century, the "intent of
Rory Little is a Professor
the Framers" has been thought to be the primary inquiry
of Law at Hastings
in constitutional interpretation! The principal focus of
the Blakely Petition for Rehearing was simply to point out College of the Law (U.C.)
in San Francisco.
that significant evidence of the Framers' own sentencing
statutes has, so far, been overlooked. Rather than look to Teresa Chen is a Deputy
English courts or common law, as the Court did at length Prosecutor in Grant
in Apprendi (530 U.S. at 478-483), the constitutional focus County, Washington, and
must be on what the Sixth Amendment's authors thought had a substantial role in
about sentencing. Our Petition presented undisputable
drafting the State's briefs
evidence that what they thought is that indeterminate sen- in Blakely.
tencing, without jury involvement, was fine. When this
is known (rather than assuming that they were unfamiliar with it, as was repeatedly suggested in Apprendi), the
constitutional "leap" needed to say that the Framers nevertheless would have condemned as unconstitutional more
precise legislative direction about how to sentence within
their ranges, becomes larger than recognized in Blakely.
Who knows, had this understanding of the Framers
been considered initially, it might even have changed a
vote.
A surprising, and significant, point about Blakely,
however, is that none of the parties or amici argued to
the Court about contemporaneous constitutional history.
The briefs are devoid of any historical presentation, even
though the question presented in Blakely- within-range
sentencing - had been expressly reserved by the Apprendi
Court immediately after it presented its historical analysis
(erroneously claiming that indeterminate sentencing had
been largely unknown to the Framers). Whatever the
explanation for this briefing lacuna, it perhaps makes
it less surprising that the Blakely Court likewise did
not discuss historical sentencing evidence specific to
the Framers. Rather, the majority merely said that "we
compiled the relevant authorities in Apprendi and need
not repeat them here" (124 S.Ct. at 2536-37).
This was an odd dodge, however, because the issue
of legislative sentencing directions given to judges, for
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sentencing within statutory ranges, was (as the Apprendi
Court repeatedly stressed, see 530 U.S. at 481-483),
a significantly different one from increasinga statutory
maximum range. Indeed, every federal Court ofAppeals to
consider the within-range question after Apprendidecided
that the distinction made a constitutional difference,
and upheld the federal Guidelines. To omit relevant
Framer-written history that bears directly on sentencing
within ranges thus seems like an interpretive error, one
that made asking for rehearing seem more than an idle
request.
Readers and scholars will have to draw their own
conclusion about whether the Framers' endorsement of
indeterminate sentencing ranges, without ever mentioning any conception of jury involvement although they
were composing the Sixth Amendment at the very same
time, has constitutional import. We do not contend that
this history settles the issue, only that it is too important
to ignore. Sadly, it is likely to be discounted at this late
date - we seem to be too far down the Blakely road,
though it has been only a few months, to re-consider the
constitutional issue afresh. 3 At the very least, however,
this unconsidered evidence shows that the Framers were
fully aware that judicial fact-finding would be necessary
to set precise sentences for the federal crimes they were
defining. Yet they never connected their within-range sentencing regime to any aspect of their Constitutional jury
guarantees. Further responses to some of Justice Scalia's
criticisms of the dissenters' constitutional views can be
found in the Petition at pages 6-7 & n. 9.
On the Cutting Room Floor
The Supreme Court's rules provide that a Petition for
Rehearing can be only iopages long, and that no supportive amicus briefs are permitted. Washington State
was thus somewhat constrained in how much it could
offer in its Petition. Moreover, we were rushing to file the
Petition so that it could be considered at the same time
as the Solicitor General's expedited certioraripetitions in
Booker and Fanfan.4 (In fact our Petition was listed for the
same Court conference as Booker and Fanfan; we do not
know if it was actively considered at that time. It was not
denied until three weeks later.) Consequently, we were
compelled to cut three pages (close to 25%) of our draft
on the morning of its printing. Two of the arguments we
eliminated may be of interest.
The first "cut" argument noted the possible irony
that a guidelines system enacted directly by a legislature
(Washington's) might be struck down, while a "sentencing
commission's" administrative construct might yet be
upheld:
"Washington State is committed to its guideline system, developed after many years of study and well
before the federal system. Washington's system represents a democratic legislative choice, rather than
the views of an administrative commission. Indeed,
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Washington's system is more discretionary than, and
free of criticisms leveled against, the federal system.
Washington's structure does not mandate any upward
adjustment, no matter what the facts; has few and
reasonable mandatory minimums; and prohibits aggravated sentences based on facts that would establish
any additional or more serious crime."
Our second "cut" argument addressed the specific
facts of Mr. Blakely's case, and the "harmlessness" of any
non-jury sentencing determination, a la United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). The aggravating factor in
Mr. Blakely's case was "deliberate cruelty." But Blakely
never contested his actions: he kidnapped his estranged
wife at gunpoint, and as he compelled his terrified 13
year-old son to watch, Blakely put his wife (the boy's
mother with whom he lived) in a coffin-sized box in
the back of his pickup. Blakely then ordered the boy to
drive a following car, alone, for many miles or he would
kill the boy's mother. (Indeed, Mr. Blakely is currently
back in custody on charges that he subsequently hired
a killer to murder his wife and daughter.) Blakely's only
argument at sentencing was that his cruelty was not
"deliberate," but the sentencing judge found that that
particular argument had been waived. With the basic
facts conceded, the only remaining issue to be decided
under the Washington statute was whether the facts
amounted to cruelty "substantial and compelling" enough
to warrant an aggravated sentence. This seems plainly to
be an issue of judgment, not fact, of the sort traditionally
reserved for judicial determination. Moreover, wasn't the
evidence on this factor "overwhelming" and "essentially
uncontroverted," which Cotton says is the standard for
harmless Apprendi error?
Ah,well, such are the choices any appellate briefwriter
makes. And it didn't seem to matter - the Court continued
its unbroken 4o-year history of denying Petitions for
Rehearing. But whether or not a formal rehearing petition
was granted, there is no doubt that this Fall's cases will
require the Justices to reconsider the constitutional theory
of Blakely. As Justice Breyer suggested in his dissent
(counselling "further argument"), it would have been
fairer to allow Washington State to participate in that
reconsideration, rather than be the sole jurisdiction, at
this moment, whose sentencing system has been declared
unconstitutional (although experts believe that over 20
other States may be affected).
One further thought. Supreme Court rule 44.1 suggests
that Blakely's dissenting Justices could not take part in
any rehearing evaluation. The same will not be true this
Fall in Booker and Fanfan. Perhaps the "lost" history of
Apprendi will be considered there.
Notes
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Accord, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)
(although the ineluctable force of the ApprendiBlakely engine
may well put the result in McMillan at risk, as explained in
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Justice Breyer's concurrence in United States v. Harris, 536
U.S. 545, 569 (2002)). Even Justice Stevens' dissenting views
regarding constitutionally-required jury sentencing have been
limited to the capital context, in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 476, 482 (1984). Justice Stevens' early-stated views in
Spaziano also go far to explain his steady, if unusual, alliance
with Justice Scalia over a decade later in the Apprendi
doctrinal line.
On this point, one of the many ironies of Blakely is that its
newly discovered constitutional limit on legislatively-directed
sentencing schemes comes principally from Justice Scalia,
who of course has been the Court's leading proponent of
constitutional originalism and "plain language" limitation.
Compare, for example, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000), issued
the same day as Apprendi: "The proposition that the Supreme

Court has power to impose extra-constitutional constraints
upon the States" is "not the system that was established by
the Framers."
We think it is clear that this history can influence the Blakely
issue without requiring overruling Apprendi. Indeed, a
constitutional distinction between facts that simply direct
discretion within a clear and reasonable statutory range,
versus facts that can increase the range, seems
unremarkable. It is quite simply the basic distinction between
separate offenses and a single offense that provides for
individualized distinctions within an indeterminate sentencing
range.
A separate "Motion for Expedited Consideration and
Argument in Tendem with the Federal Cases" was filed
concurrently with our Petition (and was likewise denied on
August 23).

Petition for Rehearing on Behalf of
The State of Washington
in Blakely v. Washington, No. 02-1632
(filed July 26, 2004)
I. The Historical Evidence the Court Has Relied On to Interpret the Meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendm ents is Inaccurate and Incom plete ................................................................ I
II. Because this Court Will Soon Again Hear Arguments About Apprendi, Fairness to the State of Washington
Supports Reargum ent in this Case ................................................................. 7
[Original page numbers appear in breakets]
[Page i] "The Court has rightly been parsimonious
in ordering rehearings, but the occasions on which
important and difficult cases have been reargued have,
I believe, enhanced the deliberative process." City
of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 357 U.S. 913, 915 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
In dissent to this Court's June 24, 2004, ruling in this
case (Blakely"Slip Op."), Justice Breyer proposed that this
case be scheduled for "further argument." Slip Op. at 21
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition to the serious concerns
Justice Breyer raised, Washington State now provides to
the Court significant historical evidence not considered
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), or in
this case. See Slip Op. at 6 ("we compiled the relevant
[historical] authorities in Apprendi... and need not repeat
them here"). This evidence bears directly on the Framers'
intent regarding indeterminate sentencing statutes. It
indicates that an historical assumption that was centrally
relied upon in Apprendi(and incorporated in Blakely) was
erroneous. Consideration of this new, precept-altering
historical evidence merits rehearing. See Reid v. Covert,
352 U.S. 901 (1956) (granting rehearing in right to jury
trial case, in part to consider "historical evidence" bearing
on Framers' intent).
In addition, the unprecedented turmoil and confusion
that this Court's June 24 decision engendered was not
fully appreciated when the ruling was issued. See Stem,
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Gressman, et al.,
Supreme CourtPractice,(8th ed. 2002)
at 729. For example, although the Court referenced possible effects on the sentencing structures of nine States (see
Slip Op. at ii, O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), it is now clear that
the number of States that will be adversely affected is at
least doublethat number.' It is also becoming increasingly
clear [Page 2] that the effects of this Court's opinion will be
adverse to the long-term interests of criminal defendants.
Finally, since June 24, 2004, two expedited certiorari

petitions have been filed by the United States, requesting
"guidance" about the federal sentencing guidelines. See
Petitions for Certiorari in United States v. Booker, No. 03104 and United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-105 (filed July
21, 2004). It seems dear that this Court will very soon be
readdressing the constitutional underpinnings of its June
24 decision. Rather than being narrowly limited to the
federal regime, the upcoming arguments will surely have
to address the "deep structure" of Blakely and Apprendi,
and will directly impact the interests of dozens of States.
For all these reasons, Washington hereby respectfully
requests that rehearing be granted in its case and (by an
accompanying Motion) that reargument be scheduled in
tandem with the upcoming federal cases.

I. The Historical Evidence the Court Has Relied On
to Interpret the Meaning of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments is Inaccurate and Incomplete
Underlying both the Blakely majority opinion and the
principal dissent was an assumption that the Framers
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were unfamiliar with judicial discretion in criminal sentencing, i.e., indeterminate sentencing schemes. The
Blakely majority merely incorporated what Apprendi said
on this point. Blakely Slip Op. at 6; see, e.g., Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 481 (asserting that at the time of the framing of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, "statutes provid[ed]
fixed-term sentences"). The dissenters here also accepted
this assumption, see Slip Op. at io (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Because broad judicial sentencing discretion was
foreign to the Framers ..... ).
However, the Court was in error insofar as the Framers
themselves were concerned. Historical records confirm
[Page 3] that, whatever may have been the situation in
English courts or at common law, the Framers themselves
wrote discretionary, indeterminate criminal sentencing
provisions.2 In 1789-90, the First Congress - the same
legislators who contemporaneously adopted the Bill of
Rights, see i Stat. 97 (Sept. 1789), - enacted numerous
indeterminate sentencing provisions.3 For example, that
legislation (endorsed by influential Framers who were
in that Congress such as James Madison) defined the
following federal crimes and yoked them to the following
indeterminate punishments:
* Misprision of treason, "shall be imprisoned not
exceeding seven years" (i Stat. 112, Sec.

2),

thus

creating a sentencing range of zero to 84 months;
* Misprision of felony, "shall be imprisoned not
exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding five
hundred dollars" (i Stat. II 3 , Sec. 6), thus creating

a fine range and an imprisonment range of zero to
36 months;
* Stealing or falsifying court records, "shall be...
imprisoned not exceeding seven years, and
whipped not exceeding 39 stripes" (i Stat. 15-ii6,
Sec. iN), thereby creating a range of zero to 84
months and recognizing alternative sanctions.
[Page 4] Similar indeterminate sentencing ranges were
enacted for an additional 13 federal crimes.4 Rather than
being "foreign" to the Framers, it was the consistent
pattern of their legislation.
The erroneous notion that precise criminal sentences
were "invariabl[y] link[ed]" with the statutory definition
of the crime "during the years surrounding our Nation's
founding" (Apprendi,530 U.S. at 478), was not expressed
merely in passing. Rather, it was repeated over and over
in the Court's six-page historical discussion.5
This historical error takes on great significance, when
one compares the questions presented in Apprendi and
[Page 5] Blakely. In Apprendi, the erroneous historical
assumption may have gone unexplored because it could
be viewed as inconsequential to the question of facts
directed by a legislature to increasethe statutory range
tied to a crime. Indeed, the Apprendi Court stressed this
distinction immediately after canvassing common law
-

not federal -

history. See 530 U.S. at 481 (stressing

that Apprendi did not involve "imposing a judgment
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within the range prescribed by statute") (emphasis in
original). 6 However, when Blakely directly presented
the question of legislatively-directed sentencing within
a prescribed statutory range, the erroneous historical
assumption was simply incorporated by reference without
analysis.
Because the history that Washington now presents
bears directly on the Framers' understandings as they
wrote the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and has never
been examined by this Court, rehearing is appropriate.
Reid v. Covert, supra, 352 U.S. at 9oi; accord Flora
v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 167 (196o) (granting
rehearing because a factual assertion in the Court's prior
7
opinion was shown to have been erroneous).
This Court has recognized that giving interpretive
content to Bill of Rights provisions should be "guided by
the meaning ascribed to [the words] by the Framers of
the Amendment[s]." Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,
931 [Page 6] (1995). But in this case, direct evidence of
the Framers' understandings about criminal sentencing, contemporaneous with their consideration of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, has been overlooked by
the Court. It simply is not accurate that the Framers
were relying on a practice of "fixed-term sentences"
when they enshrined the constitutional right to jury trial.
Rather, the Bill of Rights' authors wrote indeterminate
criminal sentencing provisions. Yet they said nothing
to suggest that the jury trial right they were simultaneously advocating would apply to facts relevant to such
sentences.
It cannot be ignored that the Framers were Legislators
as well as Constitution-writers. While venerating the
right to trial by jury, they also strongly believed in the
authority of legislation. It is difficult to imagine that the
same legislators who wrote the Sixth Amendment as
well as many indeterminate criminal sentencing statutes
would have, at the same time, thought unconstitutional
legislative directions given to judges as to how to sentence
within the ranges they wrote. Rather, it seems likely that
the Framers would have approved of giving legislative
direction to sentencing judges, had they seen any need
for it.
The Court's June 24 opinion took Justice O'Connor
to task for an absence of "any [historical] evidence."
Slip Op. at 6 n.6 (emphasis in original). But it now
appears that, in fact, the Court's own historical account
was incomplete and erroneous. Moreover, silence can
sometimes "speak volumes:" it can be powerful evidence
of the absence of definitive constitutional or legislative
intent.8 Had the Framers believed that aggravating facts
relevant to sentencing within the ranges they wrote would
be required, under any scenario, to be the special province
of [Page 7] the jury, one imagines that they might have
said something about it.9
It must be emphasized, however, that the Court need
not decide now what bearing its historical misunderstanding in Apprendihas on the ultimate issues presented here.
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Rather, this new historical evidence is sufficient to counsel
rehearing. Reid v. Covert, supra.The appropriate occasion
for full investigation and evaluation should be a rehearing,
not merely the glimpse this Petition provides. The issues
are too weighty, and the impact on the States too disruptive,
not to merit the fullest and fairest hearing opportunity.
II. Because this Court Will Soon Again Hear Arguments
About Apprendi, Fairness to the State of Washington
Supports Reargument in this Case
Since Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
250-26o (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting), the law of criminal
sentencing in the United States has been in turmoil. Six
years later - and four weeks after this court's June 24
opinion - the situation is no better. Unprecedented [Page
8] turmoil and uncertainty in theory and in practice reign.
It is inevitable that this Court will soon have to confront
again the underlying constitutional theory of the Apprendi
line of cases. See Booker and Fanfan Petitions, supra.
The Fall arguments this Court is likely to allow cannot,
however, realistically be restricted to the narrow question
of "does Blakely invalidate the federal guidelines?" Instead, the Court will be compelled to analyze the roots
of Apprendi, to address the question whether various
distinctions presented by the United States make any
constitutionaldifference.
Accordingly, not just the federal sentencing guidelines,
but also the guideline systems in at least 19 states (see
n.i, supra), will be at issue in this Court's Fall arguments.
Many unanswered questions - including severability
of guidelines, facts that initially establish sentencing
guideline ranges, prior convictions, consecutive sentences,
mandatory minimums, retroactivity, and harmless error
doctrines - will be pressed upon the Court. These issues
are vital to the 19 affected States and are present in
Washington State's case. If the Court does not revise its
initial ruling in this case - although the new historical
evidence presented above provides ample occasion to do
so - reargument would present a full and fair opportunity
to address these issues as they affect the States.
Washington is a sovereign jurisdiction no less than
the federal government. So too are the 18 other States
whose chosen sentencing systems are now affected.
"Fair federalism" should not countenance Washington's
system being condemned, in a decision that changed
common understanding of the law in a way surprising
even to seasoned observers, while all other systems are
still being considered and the constitutional theory is
being reexamined.
If, as seems certain, the Court is going to reconsider
the theoretical underpinnings of Apprendi as applied
to legislatively-directed sentencing within indeterminate
ranges, then Washington should be allowed to reargue
this [Page 9] case as part of that enterprise. If any change
in analysis is accepted by even one Justice in the majority,
the effect could be a significantly different ruling for
Washington's statutes. Washington's system should be
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kept alive rather than condemned before all others. 0
Washington can fully represent the interests of many
States as this Court further develops its thinking.
Finally, although this Court earlier stated that its
decisions in this area "would in no way hinder the States
(or the National Government) from choosing to pursue
policies aimed at rationalizing sentencing practices."
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 n.ii (i999), it is
now apparent that the practical difficulties in complying
with the Court's June 24 decision will, in fact, prevent
many States from pursuing the sentencing regimes
their legislatures prefer. Indeed, it seems increasingly
likely that Legislatures will adopt statutory responses
that are less favorable to the overall interests of criminal
defendants. Thus some Members of Congress responded
immediately to Blakely by advocating more "mandatory
minimum" imprisonment statutes. Brent Kendall, "Bill
Adds, Increases Mandatory Minimums," The Daily
Journal, at 3 (July 6, 2004) (Rep. Coble: "mandatory
minimums may well take on added importance.., as a
result of the Supreme Court's action"). While Blakely will
produce short-term windfall benefits to some criminal
defendants, many experts are coming to agreement that
its long-term will include many adverse consequences for
that group, including increasing sentencing ranges to the
statutory maxima, rolling back sentencing "transparency"
and effective appellate review, increasing prosecutorial
power, and placing prejudicial facts before juries deciding
[Page io] guilt or innocence." If members of the June 24
majority harbored the view that their ruling would lead to
more fairness or other benefits for criminal defendants,
they ought to vote for rehearing now.
Conclusion
This Court now knows two things it did not know on
June 24, 2004: (I) it has proceeded in this area based
on a significant historical misunderstanding about the
Framers; and (2) its June 24 decision has produced
greater disruption, and more adverse consequences for
defendants, than the majority had anticipated. The issues
are too important to over a third of the States not to permit
full consideration of the accurate historical record, and
to permit a well-represented State to participate in the
expedited consideration that is forthcoming.
Thus the State of Washington respectfully requests
this Court to grant it rehearing and expedited scheduling
of argument in tandem with the federal cases (or, in the
alternative, "hold" this Petition, see n.io supra).
Respectfully submitted,
D. KNODELL,
Prosecuting Attorney
TERESA CHEN, Deputy
P.O. Box 37
Ephrata, Washington 98823

RORY K LirTLE

(509) 754-2011

San Francisco, CA 94102

JOHN

Counsel of Record
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE

LAW (U.C.)
McAllister Street
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Notes to Petition for Rehearing
Email from Jon Wool, The Vera Institute of Justice, to Rory
Little (July 23, 2004) (copy on file with Clerk). For example,
on July 22, 2004, the Governor of Tennessee appointed a
Commission to address the disruption. See generally
Douglas Berman, "Sentencing Law and Policy Blog," http://
sentencing.typepad.com.
2 In this sense the Framers themselves were progressive
sentencing reformers, making it even harder to imagine that
they would have thought unconstitutional the progressive
"guided discretion" sentencing reforms of the past 25 years.
3 The bill, entitled "An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes Against the United States," 1 Stat. 112-119, was
under consideration from May 13, 1789, when a Senate
Committee was appointed to "report a bill defining the
crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the
authority of the United States, and their punishment" (1
Annals of Congress 36, emphasis added), until passage by
both Houses of Congress in April 1790, see id. at 999, 1001;
2 Annals of Congress 1522.
4
See 1 Stat. 113, Sec. 5 (rescue of executed body, "not
exceeding twelve months") and Sec. 7 (manslaughter on
federal property, "not exceeding three years"), id. at 114,
Sec. 11 (accessory after the fact to piracy or robbery, "not
exceeding three years"), id. at 115, Sec. 12 (confederacy to
piracy, or ship's revolt, "not exceeding three years") and
Sec. 13 (maiming, "not exceeding seven years"); id. at 116,
Sec. 16 (larceny, "fine not exceeding the four-fold value of
the property ...and be publically whipped, not exceeding
thirty-nine stripes"), Sec. 17 (same for receipt of stolen
goods); and Sec. 18 (perjury, "not exceeding three years"),
id. at 117, Sec. 21 (bribery, "shall be fined and imprisoned
at the discretion of the court"), Sec. 22 (obstruction of
process, "not exceeding twelve months"), Sec. 23 (rescue of
federal offenders, "not exceeding one year"), id. at 118, Sec.
26 ("violators of the laws of nations, ... not exceeding three
years"), Sec. 28 (violation of ambassador, "not exceeding
three years"). See also 1 Stat. 83, Sec. 19 (emphasis added)
("it shall be the duty of circuit courts, in causes in equity
and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to cause the facts
on which they found their sentence or decree, fully to appear
upon the record ....
");
1 Stat. 175 (customs bribery or false
entry, "fine or imprisonment or both, in the discretion of the
court ...not [to] exceed twelve months").
5 See 530 U.S. at 478 (sanction-specific statutes were the
"general rule;" "The defendant's ability to predict with
certainty the judgment from the face of the felony
indictment flowed from the invariable linkage of punishment
with crime") (emphasis added); 479 (English judges "had
very little explicit discretion in sentencing. The substantive
criminal law tended to be sanction-specific") (quoting
Langbein); 481 ("statutes providing fixed-term sentences");
482 n.9 ("legislation ordinarily fixes the penalties") (quoting
Bishop); 483 ("historic link between verdict and judgment");
483 n.10 (referencing "the evidence we describe that
punishment was, by law, tied to the offense").
6 Thus, every Circuit to consider the Blakely issue after
Apprendi, and even after Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002), concluded that legislatively-directed sentencing
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systems, directing judges how to sentence within statutory
ranges, were constitutional. See Booker Cert. Pet., supra, at
10 n.3.
Washington has not previously brought this evidence to the
Court's attention. However, "acquir[ing] new wisdom,"
particularly in the still-evolving Apprendi era, is to be
encouraged. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). This Court may consider grounds not previously
raised by a respondent defending its judgment. United States
v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 526 (1998). The Court
should do so here, where the questions are so important, the
evidence of historical error is so clear, and the constitutional
precepts have been so fluid since Apprendi.
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741 (1999) ("We
believe ...that the founders' silence is best explained by the
simple fact that no one ...suggested the document might
strip the States of the immunity."). See also Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70 (1996); Chisolm v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 396 & n.23 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco
Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 294 (1989).
9 As for providing a "coherent alternative meaning for the
jury-trial guarantee," Slip Op. at 6 n.6, it would be merely
the simple one with which the Framers were familiar: the
Legislature defines the crime, and the defendant has the
right to ask a jury whether the facts prove him or her guilty.
Thus here, Blakely was charged with kidnaping, a simple
common-law crime, and he pled guilty, thereby authorizing a
sentence of up to 10 years imprisonment. All the facts
"essential" to a punishment up to 10 years were
encompassed by his plea: Washington's legislature has
declared that only the elements of kidnaping simpliciter are
"essential" to authorize that full punishment. Cf. Slip Op. at
5, 7 (facts "essential to the punishment" must be found by
the jury). The rest is merely legislative direction about the
details of within-range sentencing, transmitted directly to
sentencing judges. As this Court recognized in Apprendi, the
Framers designed "structural democratic constraints" that
would block extreme abuses of these principles. 530 U.S. at
490 n.16.
Given the relatively small number of crimes extant in
1790 and the clarity and simplicity of their elements, the
Framers had no need to consider, or intend, more meaning
than this. Their simple understanding ought to control
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment here.
10 For this reason, even if the Court does not grant rehearing,
we entreat the Court to "hold" this Petition for Rehearing
until the results in Booker and Fanfan are announced.
Allowing final judgment to issue against Washington now,
while a major examination of the area is scheduled for the
coming Fall, is simply unfair.
For articles and testimony detailing the impacts of, and
proposed responses to, this Court's June 24 decision, see,
e.g., Mark Osler, "The 3x Solution;" Stephanos Bibas,
"Blakely's Federal Aftermath;" and King & Klein, "Beyond
Blakely," all forthcoming in 16 Fed. Sent. Rep. (Summer
2004) and available at the Berman website, supra n.1;and
Frank Bowman, "Memoranda to U.S. Sentencing
Commission" (June 27 and July 16, 2004), also available on
the Berman website.
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